COVID-19 in Venezuela: Another Tragedy for a Free-falling Country

The task of analyzing the true extent of the COVID-19 pandemic within Venezuela could be described as an exercise in both journalistic determination and futility.

As a country well-known for its decade-long structural, political, and socioeconomic crises, it is nearly impossible to determine whether specific trends occur due to the worldwide health emergency or are a natural consequence of institutional collapse.

However, what is easy to see is that SARS‑CoV‑2 found within Simon Bolivar’s homeland the perfect den to multiply ad infinitum. Therefore, it’s natural to assume that to understand the impact of COVID-19 in Venezuela, it is vital to comprehend the country’s conditions before the pandemic.

COVID-19 meets a country in shambles

Explaining the ongoing crisis within Venezuela is a long and arduous task that requires its own individual discussion. However, it is essential to approach the topic to understand the before and after of the COVID-19 pandemic—and how it is just another difficulty in a country that balances many of them since, arguably, decades ago. 

Economically the country has been in a downward spiral since 2012, but the trend started long before that. Declared in 2019 one of the worst economic collapses in recent human history by the Institute of International Finance, the International Monetary Fund estimated the country would reach an inflation rate of 10,000,000% by the end of the said year, with the Central Bank of Venezuela admitting to an inflation increase of 53.798.500% between 2016 and 2019. 

It remains the worst inflation rate worldwide.

As a natural consequence of the devaluation of the national currency—the bolívar— as of May the country’s minimum wage sits at seven million bolívares, which equals approximately 2.40$. Not by the hour or weekly—monthly. 

Surviving with two dollars monthly is impossible in a country that lacks the structure to provide basic needs, and where 70% of the food is imported and comes with international price tags. Add underdeveloped and collapsed industries that hardly produce enough goods to supply the population, and it explains why the United Nations estimated that 94% of Venezuela’s population lived in poverty by 2019.

Under this lens, COVID-19 arrived at a country that was, by all means, in shambles. But understanding the magnitude of the pandemic within Venezuela is no easy task.

Sharp-eyed readers might have noticed that nearly all of the data is categorized as speculations or analyses done by international agencies. Of course, this is not a coincidence but the result of a governmental-backed effort to withhold crucial statistical information.

Naturally, this includes COVID-19.

The void of COVID-19 statistics

According to official reports, the first two Venezuelan cases of COVID-19 were confirmed on March 13, 2020. However, subsequent studies have determined the disease could have been around since late February. 

Since then, and as of May 12, the country has reported a total of 210,116 cases and 2,320 deaths—numbers that, by all means, make Venezuela one of the most successful South American countries when it comes to containing the disease. 

Naturally, this is an illusion. Experts worldwide agree that COVID-19 cases are underreported, and it’s near impossible to determine the true scope of the disease. This truth is twice as imposing on a country with a history of hiding statistics. 

Venezuela’s Health Ministry, for example, has not published epidemiological bulletins since May 2017, so there is no official data on preexisting health statistics preceding COVID-19. And although the government releases a daily tally of confirmed cases and deaths, they do not publish data regarding suspected cases or, most importantly, the number of tests performed. 

Regarding the latter, renowned Venezuelan news site Prodavinci reports that after 58 days of the first confirmed COVID-19 case within the country, Venezuela had only performed 574 PCR tests per million habitants, compared to the ideal 10.000 for the timeframe. As such, it ranked 49 out of 50. 

When the government attempted to claim the diagnosis numbers resulted from effective governmental practices, critical analysis of these inconsistencies was discouraged. 

Health professionals and journalists have attempted to piece together the country’s reality, and their reports paint a very different picture. However, their efforts have been met with hostility. Perhaps the most emblematic case is the 12-day imprisonment of journalist Darvinson Rojas after his research on COVID-19, but Human Rights Watch reported at least 162 incidents just within the first three months of the pandemic.

The scope of Venezuela’s healthcare crisis 

When statistical reports and official records fail, hospitals and other medical centers display the truth. 

Years before COVID-19, the healthcare industry in Venezuela was already lacking. Public hospitals have been in a constant state of abysmal abandon. Doctors lack essential equipment such as alcohol, laboratory supplies, and even running water in a whopping 68%. 

Often, patients have to find the resources themselves, which seems nearly impossible in a country facing scarcity of medicines and other medical supplies. 

On the other hand, private hospitals remain out of reach for most of Venezuela’s population since costs can often exceed $20,000 in the two weeks it can take to overcome COVID-19—completely unapproachable for most people. These numbers give Venezuela the dubious honor of having the highest out-of-pocket healthcare costs in the subcontinent.

Medical personal cannot handle the burden and they question the official numbers, particularly from their experience upon witnessing the collapse of hospitals and the lack of available beds. “If you got sick today, I have nowhere to put you,” said Dr Julio Castro to The Washington Post.

Regardless of unreliable data, both government officials and journalists agree that Venezuela escaped the worst of COVID-19 in 2020. However, March 2021 saw an increase in cases that highlighted the arrival of the Brazilian variant and, with it, a deadlier second wave.

The Brazilian variant displays a mutation—called N501Y—that makes it more contagious and easier to spread. This is particularly dangerous in a country that simply cannot afford the luxury of a quarantine. 

The dichotomy between starvation and infection

By walking down the streets of busy Venezuela, it nearly seems as if life continues the same as always. Only facemasks—most of them handmade—serve as a reminder of the ongoing health crisis. 

Although governmental limitations have helped restrict interstate transportation and communication during confinement weeks, life within each city nearly seems to continue as always. 

Certain businesses provide alcohol, hand sanitizer and ensure mask usage, but the country’s thriving informal economy cannot spare the investment and measures. As such, it’s a common sight to see violations of healthcare regulations in the few working buses, the metro system, and the busy marketplaces. That is because, for the average Venezuelan, COVID-19 is a less imposing threat when compared to the reality of starvation. 

With hyperinflation that does not allow for savings, and earnings that go well below the threshold to cover basic needs, Venezuelans need to go out on the streets to work and find food or risk death by staying at home. Teleworking is not a possibility for millions of Venezuelans, particularly with a collapsed energy industry and one of the world’s slowest internet services. 

Without other options, Venezuelans continue to go out to guarantee their daily survival. 

When caught between a rock and a hard place, it is evident most Venezuelans will choose the possibility of COVID-19 over the certainty of starvation. Understanding this dichotomy, the Venezuelan government developed a peculiar quarantine strategy to affront the pandemic with uncertain results. 

Called the 7-7 system and pushed forward by Maduro’s government, it alternates a week of strict quarantine with one of flexible measures—seven days of confinement followed by seven of work. The severity of the restrictions and the time schedules for opening business vary from region to region and answer each specific circumstance.

Due to the aforementioned lack of statistical information, it is impossible to determine if the model is successful. However, doctors and medical experts express their skepticism about the measure to BBC News. “Other countries report witnessing the results of their confinement measures after two weeks”, explains Doctor Jaime Torres. “That is why the weekly alternating system established by Venezuela may not be enough.” 

It is also clear that the 7-7 system merged with the government’s known populistic approach. Experts speculate that the deadly COVID-19 second wave within the country results from relaxed measures during the Christmas and Carnival holidays, both of which were encouraged by the government. 

However, what remains clear is that, regardless of the measure’s success, Venezuela’s population would have never been able to handle strict confinement in the first place. As such, the 7-7 system seems nearly the only viable option that could have been implemented in a country that overwhelmingly needs to leave home to survive the day.

“I know coronavirus is no joke”, says Bryan Reyes, a father of two, to Voz de America. “But it’s worse to get home and hear your son or daughter say ‘Daddy, I’m hungry.'”

As such, and considering these circumstances, vaccinating the population to induce herd immunity in the short term might be the only solution for Venezuela’s dilemma. Sadly enough, achieving this could be a lot more complicated than seems. 

The struggle for vaccines

On May 2, Enrique Lopez-Loyo, the president of Venezuela’s National Academy of Medicine, requested U.S. ambassador James Story to include Venezuela in the international donor list for COVID-19 vaccines. 

Although the Venezuelan government reports having secured 1.4 million vaccines from Russia and China to date, which is still merely 10% of what is required to stop the spread of the disease. To successfully control the pandemic is imperative to vaccinate 70% of the adult population or 15 million Venezuelans.

Naturally, this means Lopez-Loyo’s plea is not unwarranted since Venezuela is lagging in the vaccination rate of the area. However, asking the United States for help carries heavy political implications in a country torn by conflict and polarization.

The U.S.-Venezuela relations hit a new low in 2018 after Nicolás Maduro won his re-election in a process viewed as fraudulent by most countries worldwide. Since then, the U.S. has established selected sanctions to Maduro’s government and recognizes Juan Guaidó—de-facto leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly—as the country’s interim president. 

The presidential crisis in Venezuela means that Maduro—who is still acting president—and Guaidó, who has international recognition by over 60 countries, have led parallel efforts to deliver vaccines to Venezuela. This tug of war adds a political connotation to the pandemic and turns it into another power struggle.

In December last year, Maduro announced a plan to deliver ten million vaccine doses by May, but it was soon clear enough the Russian and Chinese allies would not fulfill the deal within the established timeframe. At the same time, Guaidó had been preparing a plan to use Venezuela’s frozen offshore assets in the United States to pay for vaccines using the World Health Organization’s COVAX program and was negotiating with Maduro the terms to import them within the country.

But Maduro’s government refused to proceed with the plan, as it would deliver AstraZeneca’s vaccines due to health concerns regarding side effects. Last month, however, Maduro announced that he had secured eleven million vaccines through an agreed payment of $124 million to COVAX—unilaterally. 

Quick to answer, Guaidó announced that he, too, had approved an additional of $100 million towards more vaccines by the end of the month. 

It is evident that delivering vaccines to the country had turned into yet another playing field for Venezuela’s presidential crisis, as both sides of the political conflict attempt to be the ones to deliver salvation to a country in need in coordination, not competition.

It remains to be seen whether either effort will come to fruition or remain political rhetoric. 

Uncertain Future

During the last two decades, Venezuela has proven itself to be hard to predict. The arrival of COVID-19—itself a crisis that remains unstable worldwide—adds yet another variable to the already erratic pattern the country has been following. 

It is impossible to determine the level of devastation COVID-19 has left across the country, but without an effective and country-wide vaccination effort, the numbers will keep getting worse. The infamous government-backed misinformation—such as Maduro’s claims that “miraculous” thyme-based drops can cure COVID-19—add a dangerous element to the unstable concoction brewing within Venezuela. 

However, what remains clear is that COVID-19 has set back the world’s economy by a few years. And for Venezuela, a country that has been falling backwards into the abyss for a while, it might just accelerate the sinking speed. 

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